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RESTRICTING THE REACH OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: SOUTH CAROLINA
SUPREME COURT APPLIES STATE LAW AND INVALIDATES AN ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT IN A RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION
Tiffany Bennett*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Arbitration Act (hereinafter “FAA”) was enacted at a time in United
State’s history where federal courts sitting in diversity applied a general federal common
law.1 Since 1925, the legal landscape of the country has changed dramatically. 2 In 1938,
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins eliminated the concept of federal common law and
required courts sitting in diversity to apply state law.3 However, even in light of Erie, the
FAA has been consistently applied to uphold arbitration contracts that would otherwise
be invalidated by state law.4 The FAA has had a very liberal application in the United
States law of arbitration. The FAA has been favored as the dominant force in governing
enforcement of arbitration agreements; essentially, interpretation and application of the
FAA has implied a federal right to arbitrate.5 In most cases, the FAA will preempt any
state arbitration law that would void an otherwise valid arbitration agreement under the
FAA.
In South Carolina, the Uniform Arbitration Act (hereinafter “SCUAA”) is the
applicable state law for arbitration agreements.6 Arbitration has a history in South
Carolina going back to 1795.7 Historically in South Carolina, arbitration was met with
judicial hostility; since the passage of state arbitration legislation in 1978, this hostility
has mostly given way to courts embracing and enforcing arbitral agreements.8
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1
See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842) (allowing for courts to develop federal common law where state
legislatures did not specifically address the issue in contention).
2
See id.
3
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4
See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (“Section 2 is a
congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any
state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. The effect of the section is to create a body of
federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the
Act.”); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress
declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial
forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”); see also
CARBONNEAU, infra note 43, at 73.
5
See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at n.32 (“The Arbitration Act is something of an anomaly
in the field of federal-court jurisdiction. It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and
regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does not create any independent federalquestion jurisdiction”).
6
See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-48-10 – 15-48-22.
7
See Thad H. Westbrook, A. Mattison Bogan, Arbitration Alive and Delivering Results in South
Carolina, S.C. LAW., Sep. 2008, at 24, 26.
8
Id.
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In order for the FAA to preempt state law, one necessary condition must be
present: the activity must involve interstate commerce.9 Just as the application of the
FAA has been broadly construed, so too has the definition of interstate commerce. 10 The
Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the commerce notwithstanding, the South
Carolina Supreme Court found that a residential real estate transaction between a South
Carolina corporation and a South Carolina resident was purely intrastate commerce in
Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc..11 Despite evidence of other aspects of the transaction
involving other states, South Carolina refused to apply the FAA and instead chose to
invalidate the agreement based on state law.12
II. FACTS
A. The Agreement
Fred Bradley and his wife contracted with Brentwood Homes to purchase a newly
constructed home in North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.13 Brentwood was clear in
Section 22H of the contract that they were not to be treated as the contractor and only as
the seller of a finished home for the specific sales transaction.14 The precise language of
Section 22H was as follows:
It is understood that Purchaser is buying a completed dwelling and that
Seller is not acting as a contractor for Purchaser in the construction of a
dwelling. Purchaser will acquire no right, title or interest in the dwelling
except the right and obligation to purchase the same in accordance with
the terms of this Agreement upon the completion of the dwelling.15
The Home Purchase Agreement was entered into on January 31, 2007 and the Bradley’s
closed on the home on March 2, 2007.16
Approximately two years after purchasing the home, Bradley initiated a lawsuit
against Brentwood on July 31, 2009.17 In the initial complaint, Bradley alleged fraud,
9

See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (defining interstate commerce: “means commerce among the several States
or with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia, or between
any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between
the District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation”) ; Timms v. Greene, 427 S.E.2d 642,
644 (S.C. 1993) (explaining “Interstate commerce is a necessary basis for application of the Federal Act,
and a contract or agreement not so predicated must be governed by State Law”).
10
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995) (“[affecting commerce]
normally signals Congress' intent to exercise its Commerce Clause powers to the full.”); see generally
Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312, 315 (S.C. 2012) (discussing the Supreme Court of the
United States’ decisions defining the correct interpretation of interstate commerce).
11
Bradley, 730 S.E.2d at 318.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 313.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 313, n.3.
16
Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312, 313 (S.C. 2012).
17
Id. at 314.
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negligence, and breach of implied warranty.18 Bradley based his claims on alleged
“construction defects” within the home.19 The action continued in state court for more
than six months.20 Amidst the discovery requests, Brentwood Homes filed an amended
answer and motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration based on a provision in the
Home Purchase Agreement.21
Brentwood asserted that the court did not have jurisdiction over the case based on
the arbitration clause in the Home Purchase Agreement.22 The pertinent language of the
agreement provided:
Mandatory Binding Arbitration. Purchaser and Seller each agree that, to
the maximum extent allowed by law, they desire to arbitrate all disputes
between themselves. The list of disputes which shall be arbitrated in
accordance with this paragraph include, but are not limited to: (1) any
claim arising out of Seller's construction of the home, (2) Seller's
performance under any Punch List or Inspection Agreement, (3) Seller's
performance under any warranty contained in this Agreement or
otherwise, and (4) any matters as to which Purchaser and Seller agree to
arbitrate.23
The agreement also included a choice of law clause that indicated the South Carolina
Uniform Arbitration Act would apply to the current situation.24 Because the SCUAA
would clearly invalidate the arbitration provision,25 Brentwood also argued that the FAA
should apply in lieu of South Carolina law. 26
B. The Dispute
Bradley opposed the arbitration clause and asserted that the FAA should not apply
in this situation because the transaction occurred entirely in South Carolina between a
South Carolina resident and a South Carolina corporation concerning property located in
South Carolina.27 Additionally, Bradley argued that even if the court did not consider the
transaction purely intrastate, that Brentwood had waived their right to arbitrate by failing
to attempt to enforce the clause during more than six months of discovery requests.28

18

Id.
Id.
20
Id.
21
Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312, 314 (S.C. 2012).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See id. at 314, n. 4 (reproducing part of the second page of the agreement: “THIS CONTRACT IS
SUBJECT TO MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION PURSUANT TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA
or NORTH CAROLINA UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT, WHICHEVER IS APPLICABLE.”).
25
Id. at 314, n. 5 (explaining the South Carolina provision requires strict adherence to technical
requirements, including placement of the arbitration clause and typeface requirements).
26
Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312, 314, n. 5 (S.C. 2012).
27
Id. at 314.
28
Id.
19
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Brentwood presented evidence that the contract required the purchase of a
nationwide warranty that would involve submitting claims to an office in Georgia, and
evidence that Bradley completed the purchase using financing from a bank in North
Carolina.29 Brentwood additionally contended that interstate commerce was used to
purchase and transport the materials Brentwood used in the actual construction of the
home.30 Finally, Brentwood established that some of the labor involved in the
construction of the home was subcontracted from outside of South Carolina.31
The lower court found the agreement to arbitrate was invalid under South
Carolina law.32 Further, the lower court held that Brentwood had not satisfied the
evidentiary burden to establish the presence of interstate commerce and applicability of
the FAA.33 The court gave very little weight to the evidence presented by Brentwood of
the interstate nature of the construction of the house, because nothing indicating out of
state supplies or labor was included in the contract.34 Brentwood Homes appealed and the
Supreme Court of South Carolina certified the appeal and analyzed the issue of whether
the disputed transaction involved interstate commerce, or if the transaction was purely
intrastate. 35
III. ANALYSIS
A. The South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act and Standard of Review
In South Carolina, arbitration issues are reviewed de novo, however, the court will
defer to all reasonable factual conclusions made by the lower court. 36 Because of this,
even though Brentwood argued that the lower court did not consider certain evidence, the
South Carolina Supreme Court chose not to reexamine the affidavit of a former
employee, satisfied by the mention of the evidence in the lower court opinion.37
Brentwood did not contest the finding that the SCUAA would invalidate the
agreement for failing to meet the structuring formalities.38 The SCUAA requires:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy
thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract. Notice that a contract is subject to arbitration pursuant to this
chapter shall be typed in underlined capital letters, or rubber-stamped
29

Id. at 314-15 (discussing the affidavits offered by Brentwood Homes).
Id. at 315.
31
Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312, 315 (S.C. 2012).
32
Id. at 315.
33
Id. at 317-18.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 315.
36
Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312, 315 (S.C. 2012).
37
Id. at 315.
38
Id. (admitting that the agreement was not present or noticed on the first page of the contract and did
not adhere to the typeface requirements of S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10 (2012)).
30
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prominently, on the first page of the contract and unless such notice is
displayed thereon the contract shall not be subject to arbitration.39
However, Brentwood argued, and the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed, that state
arbitration laws will usually only apply when in accordance with the FAA.40 The FAA
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States to preempt any state law
provisions that invalidate arbitration agreements.41 The decision to apply the FAA to
enforce otherwise invalid arbitration clauses is part of the strong federal policy
supporting the “rapid” and “unobstructed” enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.42 The
Supreme Court of the United States has continually reaffirmed federalization and
supported arbitration as an effective alternative method of dispute resolution.43
B. Nature of the Commerce Involved in a Residential Real Estate Agreement
and the Applicability of the FAA
South Carolina recognizes the preemptive effect of the FAA, however only in
instances where interstate commerce is a feature of the transaction. 44 To determine
whether interstate commerce was involved in the disputed transaction, the court evaluated
the “essential character” of the contract, including both the text of the contract and the
circumstances surrounding the transaction.45
The South Carolina Supreme Court considered the evidence offered in the lower
court pertaining to incidents of interstate commerce and agreed with the lower court that
Brentwood had not carried its burden of proving that the contract for the sale of the home
involved interstate commerce.46 Notably, the court expressly mentioned that the analysis
would have been different, and the FAA may have applied, had the contract at issue been
for the construction of the home and not solely for the sale.47 However, the inclusion of
clause 22H (discussed supra), prevented the South Carolina Supreme Court from
applying that analysis.48
Historically, South Carolina has treated real estate issues as the “quintessential
example of a purely intrastate activity” even when instances of interstate commerce
occurred because of a sale contract.49 The court agrees with precedent that establishes
39

S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (2012).
Bradley, 730 S.E.2d at 315.
41
See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
42
See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 927, 941 (1983) (discussing
the federal policy favoring arbitration and rationale behind federalization).
43
See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 12123 (6th ed., Thomson/West 2012) (describing the history, importance, and continued application of
federalization).
44
Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312, 315 (2012) (explaining the applicability and use
of preemption regarding certain state laws where interstate commerce exists in the disputed transaction).
45
Id. at 316 (citing a discussion of how to assess the extent of the commerce involved in a contract
from Thornton v. Trident Med. Ctr., LLC, 592 S.E.2d 50, 52 (S.C. Ct.App.2003)).
46
Id. at 317-18.
47
Id. at 318, n.8.
48
Id.
49
Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 553 S.E.2d 110, 117-18 (S.C. 2001) (propounding a general
discussion of the treatment of real estate transactions in South Carolina).
40
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that the use of an out of state engineer and out of state financing in a commercial
transaction were tangential occurrences of interstate commerce and not central to the
issue of whether interstate commerce was involved in the contract.50
The South Carolina Supreme Court adhered to the Mathews51 analysis and
additionally relied on reasoning from a similar Kentucky case, which held that residential
real estate sales do not involve interstate commerce even if diversity of citizenship exists
among the parties.52 The Kentucky courts cited uniformity in the law as a policy rationale
for their decision,53 a concept that South Carolina echoed by grounding their decision in a
desire to avoid “[eviscerating] the well-established real estate exception to the FAA.”54
IV. SIGNIFICANCE
As an issue of first impression in South Carolina, this decision has important
implications for drafters of arbitration clauses and real estate contracts alike. Parties who
prefer to implement a choice of law clause that selects the South Carolina Uniform
Arbitration Act as the applicable law must also follow the technical requirements
imposed by the legislation; otherwise they risk invalidation of the agreement.
Alternatively, real estate contract drafters may opt to include specific information in the
contract that directly references interstate commerce to ensure the FAA will govern the
agreement in the event it fails under some other state law provision. Seemingly, interstate
commerce that results from the sale contract will be considered tangential and not be
enough to invoke the protection of the FAA.
Additionally companies that act as both the contractor and the seller may choose
to formulate their contracts differently, for example, omitting the 22H provision that was
present in Brentwood’s contract, and be afforded a presumption of interstate commerce. 55
Further, by advancing the “real estate exception,”56 the South Carolina Supreme Court
has diminished the traditional broad interpretation of the nature of interstate commerce,
and by using persuasive authority from other states, the decision seems to encourage
other states to continue to carve-out a residential real estate exception.57

50

See Mathews v. Fluor Corp., 440 S.E.2d 880 (S.C. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Munoz v.
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 542 S.E.2d 360, 363 n. 3 (S.C. 2001).
51
Id.
52
Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312, 317 (S.C. 2012) (discussing the analysis in
Saneii v. Robards, 289 F.Supp.2d 855 (W.D. Ky. 2003)).
53
See Saneii, 289 F.Supp.2d at 859.
54
Bradley, 730 S.E.2d at 317.
55
Id. at 318, n.8 (explaining South Carolina law that presumes interstate commerce is necessary in the
construction of certain structures).
56
Id. at 317.
57
See generally 11 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 233 (Originally published in 2006) (providing a list and summary of
real estate contract disputes where courts held that interstate commerce was not a component of the
particular transaction and applying state law).
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V. CRITIQUE
In light of the United States Supreme Court’s liberal policy favoring arbitration,
decisions that appear antithetical to arbitration must be carefully scrutinized. The major
objective of the FAA is to enforce parties’ agreements to arbitrate.58 The Supreme Court
of the United States has emphasized the importance of freedom of contract by stating,
“private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.”59 However, the
Supreme Court retreated slightly from the absolute freedom of contract view expressed in
Volt, and qualified the right to freedom of contract by proclaiming that individuals have
contract freedom as long as your provisions do not impede the ability to arbitrate.60
South Carolina also recognizes that arbitration is a matter of contract, and when
reviewing arbitration clauses relies on the principles announced in Zabinski, namely that
“Arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration
any dispute which he has not agreed to submit.”61 However, in Bradley, both parties
signed the agreement, including the arbitration agreement.62 The agreement expressly
provided the buyer and seller would arbitrate all claims, including claims related to the
construction of the home.63 However, Brentwood’s expectation to arbitrate any claim
arising from the construction of the home, which Bradley had agreed to by executing the
contract, was eliminated by the court because the placement of the otherwise valid
arbitration agreement within the contract did not conform to the applicable state law
formatting requirements. Although South Carolina’s hostility toward arbitration has
lessened since 1795, in 2007 the South Carolina Supreme Court announced their
“skepticism” toward adhesive contracts between a consumer and an automobile dealer
with unequal bargaining power when the arbitration provision is not conspicuous in
Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach.64 The South Carolina Supreme Court used the
“skepticism” in that case to render an adhesive arbitration provision invalid because it

58

See 9 U.S.C. §2 (2006) (stating “A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”).
59
See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)
(allowing parties freedom to construct their arbitration clauses to meet their preference and include or
exclude issues subject to arbitration).
60
See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 66 (1995) (invalidating a choice of
law clause that would have limited the award of punitive damages).
61
Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (S.C. 2001) (discussing South Carolina’s
precedent for determining the scope of arbitration agreements and honoring arbitration clauses in situations
that parties anticipated the clause would govern).
62
Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312, 314 (S.C. 2012).
63
Id.
64
Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 644 S.E.2d 663, 670 (S.C. 2007) (“[We] proceed to analyze
this contract between a consumer and automobile retailer with “considerable skepticism.” Under this
approach, we first observe that the contract between Simpson and Addy involved a vehicle intended for use
as Simpson's primary transportation, which is critically important in modern day society. Applying the
factors considered by the Fourth Circuit in analyzing arbitration clauses, we also acknowledge Simpson's
claim that she did not possess the business judgment necessary to make her aware of the implications of the
arbitration agreement, and that she did not have a lawyer present to provide any assistance in the matter.”).
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lacked mutuality and was unconscionable because of three oppressive terms.65 The
holding in Bradley furthers the skepticism of the court when reviewing arbitration
agreements not by finding the inconspicuous agreement unconscionable, rather it
accomplishes this by restricting the application of the FAA to residential real estate
contracts based on an interpretation of “commerce” inconsistent with United States
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
Additionally, the South Carolina Supreme Court had the opportunity to avoid
analyzing the applicability of the FAA and instead address the issue of waiver. In South
Carolina, whether a party has waived their right to arbitrate is a fact intensive inquiry
where the party seeking to establish waiver has the burden of establishing that the delay
in compelling arbitration proceedings caused undue hardship.66 Courts will evaluate the
length of the delay, the number of times the parties sought the court’s assistance, the
number and nature of motions filed, and the expenses incurred by the parties.67 Because
the court dispenses of this argument in a footnote by finding the inapplicability of the
FAA dispositive, the facts do not indicate what evidence, if any, was provided at the trial
court level on the issue of waiver.68 Because the prejudice to a party is relative to the
unique situation, the six-month delay may have been long enough for Bradley to establish
that Brentwood waived the right to arbitrate.69 However, because the court did not
analyze the issue, the record does not indicate whether the court may have found for
Bradley without undercutting the reach and applicability of the FAA in South Carolina.
The Supreme Court of the United States has also expressed its disapproval of state
laws requiring the type of notice that the South Carolina law requires. 70 Because
arbitration is an expert driven, efficient, and economical way to resolve disputes and
provide a meaningful alternative to litigation and because arbitration reduces the strain on
the overburdened state court systems, honoring the bargain to arbitrate is vital to

65

Id. at 670-73. (reasoning that limitation on statutory remedies, availability of some judicial remedies
to the dealer during the arbitration proceedings, and restricting warranty claims to arbitration are all
unconscionable terms included in the arbitration provision which was found in small print toward the end
of the agreement).
66
See Gen. Equip. & Supply Co., Inc. v. Keller Rigging & Const., SC, Inc., 544 S.E.2d 643, 645 (S.C.
Ct. App. 2001); Liberty Builders, Inc. v. Horton, 521 S.E.2d 749, 753-54 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999).
67
See, e.g., General Equip. & Supply Co., 554 S.E.2d. at 645; Liberty Builders, Inc., 521 S.E.2d at
753-54 (“The circuit judge found “[o]n approximately forty occasions, the parties over the [more than two]
years have sought assistance from the Court including but not limited to motions to amend, compel,
dismiss, add parties and to restore under SCRCP 40(j).” The delays in resolving these issues and the
attorney fees incurred by the Hortons during this lengthy litigation were sufficient to support the circuit
judge's finding of prejudice”).
68
Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312, 318, n.9 (S.C. 2012).
69
See General Equip. & Supply Co., 554 S.E.2d. at 646 (an 8 month delay was not sufficient to
establish waiver based on the additional facts); Evans v. Accent Manufactured Homes, Inc., 575 S.E.2d 74,
76 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (a nineteen month delay in seeking arbitration, when viewed in the specific
circumstances did constitute waiver of the right to arbitrate when a homeowner sued the seller of a mobile
home for breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of fitness, negligence, and fraud).
70
See, e.g., Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (discussing a state
requirement that the arbitration clause be provided on the first page of the agreement: “Montana's first-page
notice requirement would invalidate the clause. The “goals and policies” of the FAA, this Court's precedent
indicates, are antithetical to threshold limitations placed specifically and solely on arbitration provisions”).
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providing parties access to final, binding solutions to their disputes.71 South Carolina has
recognized arbitration as a viable alternative to judicial proceedings, 72 yet the state
statutory scheme limits parties’ abilities to enforce arbitration agreements. Moreover, the
court decisions undermine both the bargain for arbitration and the Supreme Court of the
United State’s jurisprudence related to federalization. The South Carolina Supreme Court
should have used the approach announced in Vaden v. Discover Bank and “looked
through” the petition to find federal jurisdiction and compel the arbitration.73
An additional attack on federalization comes with the South Carolina Supreme
Court’s adoption of the reasoning in Saneii, which goes even farther than the analysis in
Bradley requires by reasoning that addressing the citizenship of the parties is not enough
to evidence interstate commerce in a transaction. This was clearly announced by the
Supreme Court of the United States when the issue of diversity of citizenship had
previously come before the court: “This Court responded by agreeing that the Act set
forth substantive law, but concluding that, nonetheless, the Act applied in diversity cases
because Congress had so intended.”74 Terminix also stands for the understanding that if
interstate commerce is even questionably related to a transaction, courts should invoke
the commerce clause and apply the FAA.75 The United States Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Terminix was meant to streamline the law and prevent complication and litigation.76
In Bradley, the court cites a similar desire to achieve uniformity and stability in
the law by promoting the “well-established real estate exception.”77 However, the only
evidence of the so-called exception the court offers is the short summary of a United
States District Court in Puerto Rico’s analysis of two other cases. 78 The exception is
neither well established nor in accordance with the views the Supreme Court of the
United States has continually expressed in the establishment and reaffirmation of the
policy of federalization.
Furthermore, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court of the United States has
granted state courts the authority to create or propagate exceptions to the FAA.79 The real
71

See generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 43, at 1-6 (defining arbitration and discussing the nature
and importance of the arbitral trial as an efficient cost-effective dispute resolution mechanism in the United
States).
72
See White v. Preferred Research, Inc., 432 S.E.2d 506, 508 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993) (“arbitration is not
litigation carried on by other means. It is intended to be, and it is, an alternative means for resolving
disputes without the cost and delay of a lawsuit.”).
73
See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 62 (2009) (“The text of § 4 drives our conclusion that a
federal court should determine its jurisdiction by “looking through” a § 4 petition to the parties' underlying
substantive controversy. We reiterate § 4's relevant instruction: When one party seeks arbitration pursuant
to a written agreement and the other resists, the proponent of arbitration may petition for an order
compelling arbitration”).
74
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271 (1995) (reaffirming the federalism
trilogy and expanding the interpretation of the commerce clause).
75
See generally CARBONNEAU, supra note 43, at 197.
76
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc, 513 U.S. at 275.
77
Bradley v. Brentwood Homes, Inc., 730 S.E.2d 312, 317 (S.C. 2012).
78
Id. at 317 (citing the proclamation in Garrison v. Palmas Del Mar Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 538 F.
Supp. 2d 468, 473 (D.P.R. 2008) “FAA generally does not apply to residential real estate transactions that
have no substantial or direct connection to interstate commerce”).
79
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984) (“We discern only two limitations on the
enforceability of arbitration provisions governed by the Federal Arbitration Act: they must be part of a
written maritime contract or a contract “evidencing a transaction involving commerce” 5 and such clauses
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estate exception does not appear anywhere in the FAA.80 The United States Supreme
Court has not announced a real estate exception in any arbitration jurisprudence.
Even in light of the disparity in reasoning between the two courts, Bradley continues to
be good law in South Carolina and practitioners must be aware of the judicial hostility
toward arbitration that pervades the area of real estate contracts and take great care to
draft agreements accordingly.

may be revoked upon “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” We see
nothing in the Act indicating that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any additional
limitations under State law”).
80
See 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 (2006).
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